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Who is There? Subjectivity, Transformation, and the Child’s Journey in Ursula K.
Le Guin’s The Tombs of Atuan
Abstract
The intricately crafted worlds of Ursula K. Le Guin provoke us into thinking about our own world’s
constructs, our languages, and our very being. Though The Tombs of Atuan sets many puzzles for
readers, subjectivity, or what it means to be an individual person, is an overarching theme. The paper
demonstrates how The Tombs’ narrative leads readers through three stages of identification of name to
subject: an initial, partial identification (Tenar), a passage to namelessness and near-negation of self
(Arha) and finally, the retrieval of the name (Tenar). These three stages, or moments of naming, (and
calling) reflect an active, violent and unstable process of subjectivation – a process through which human
beings do seem to go, in the passage from childhood to adulthood. The fact that we are beings whose
journeys can include radical destruction and transformation is itself crucial. The paper concludes that a
certain will to power, friendship and a limited type of self-knowledge or intuition all subsist the stripping
away of the name and self in Arha, (and in the passage from childhood to adulthood), and enable a
performative and experiential retrieval of identity. As such, it seems that if The Tombs of Atuan is to yield
any notion of a subject, no set of universally true and immutable conditions can be delineated. Rather, an
individual’s who is formed and performed in the ethical sphere, meaning that performative and
transformative practices and events occurring with, and in relation to, others contribute to the very
constitution of self. In this respect, parallels between Tenar’s story and women’s initiation rites can be
drawn. Le Guin’s tale may provide symbols and moments by which to understand the profound
transformation a child undergoes in adolescence.
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HO I S T HERE ?

S U BJ EC TIV I TY ,
T RAN S FOR MA T ION , AN D TH E
C H IL D ’ S J OUR NEY IN
U R SU LA K. L E G U IN ’ S T HE T O MB S O F A TUAN
M EGHANN C ASSIDY

B

UTTERFLY METAMORPHOSIS IS RADICAL:

a larva does not merely lie within its
chrysalis, passively waiting for new appendages to sprout before ultimately
emerging. Instead, “a caterpillar first digests itself.” Its larva body is liquified
into a mushy, runny goo. “But certain groups of cells survive, turning the soup
into eyes, wings, antennae and other adult structures” (Jabr). Moreover, this
radical, near-complete breakdown of the individual within the cocoon remains
hidden from the outside world, occurring instead in an intimate, private, and
obscure setting. For those familiar with Ursula K. Le Guin’s Earthsea series, in
particular the multi-layered and compelling second volume, the larva’s tale of
profound transformation may very well strike a chord.
Just as insect metamorphosis seems to captivate human curiosity, so
too do the stories of human transformation and growing up that we recount and
create. Critics, including Le Guin herself, have argued that the first two tomes
of the Earthsea works, A Wizard of Earthsea and The Tombs of Atuan, are classic
Bildungsroman (“Dreams Must Explain Themselves” [“Dreams”] 11; Griffin).
Indeed, both Ged and Tenar embark upon dark, profoundly transformative
journeys in childhood; not unlike the caterpillar, Tenar is “eaten” and must
literally, and violently, emerge from her obscure, cavernous dwelling, before
claiming a more stable, meaningful identity (The Tombs of Atuan [Tombs] 178).
But what, on a mythopoeic level, do the events at The Tombs of Atuan, against
the backdrop of Earthsea’s histories and metaphysics, impart to young and adult
readers about themselves and their own experiences of metamorphosis and
selfhood?
This paper argues that The Tombs of Atuan provides readers with a story
of transformation that challenges the notion of a unified, individual, and
permanent subject and that powerfully leads readers, young and old, to a more
fragmented, relational, and contingent notion of the self. To demonstrate this
hypothesis, the first section, “Provoking Thought,” deals with how Le Guin’s
fiction engages readers in games of make-believe which, in turn, disrupt and
unearth certain nonfictional beliefs that ground our reality. The next section,
“The Laws of Earthsea,” describes some of the nonfictional, metaphysical
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concepts that this make-believe world brings to light. Namely, it underscores a
tension at the heart of our everyday concept of the self. The Tombs of Atuan
specifically appears to experiment with this tension, and its two competing
forms of subjectivity. The third section of the paper accordingly describes this
tale of “Subjectivation”; its subsections detail the linguistic and narrative
elements which engage readers in the conceptual puzzle: who/what is Tenar and
who/what are we? We’ll see how the tale draws readers into a hypothetical
scenario which strips the subject of many supposedly essential qualities and
finally leads readers to a more complex, and yet fractured, understanding of
selfhood. In conclusion, the paper identifies the conditions for selfhood that The
Tombs of Atuan’s narrative does in fact put forth and draws a parallel with our
own experiences of metamorphosis and initiation during adolescence.
In short, an analysis of the effects of Le Guin’s “descriptive” fiction, of
Earthsea’s metaphysics and, finally, of the text’s narrative and formal elements
will demonstrate how The Tombs of Atuan alters our own notion of who we are,
have been as children, and can become (“Dreams” 11). The journey through
childhood and adolescence, as verbalized and ritualized in The Tombs of Atuan,
shifts our understanding of ourselves from a relatively permanent and essential
subjectivity toward a fragmented, yet volitional, highly social, and performative
selfhood.
PROVOKING THOUGHT
The conceptual shift that is brought about by The Tombs of Atuan is, in
first place, a result of the thought-provoking nature of Le Guin’s work. Though
her stories are truly a delight to the senses, they also provoke thought, in both
senses of the term ‘provoke’: they give rise to and induce thinking, and they also
might push buttons, and even vex some readers.
This latter connotation of the word ‘provoke’ is probably related to
the first causal sense. That is, Le Guin’s stories may push buttons precisely
because they initiate changes in our thinking. The worlds she creates poke and
prod at the very limits of our language, culture and conceptual frameworks,
whether we are talking about gender pronouns on Gethen, hidden names and
namelessness in Earthsea, or the darkness and violence inherent in the human
condition, and thus, in childhood.
To use an expression she herself employed regarding her work, Le
Guin sometimes engages her readers in a series of thought experiments. In her
introduction to The Left Hand of Darkness, she tells us:
This book is not extrapolative. If you like it you can read it […] as a
thought-experiment. […] The purpose of a thought-experiment, as the
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term was used by Schrödinger and other physicists, is not to predict the
future […]—but to describe reality, the present world. […]
Certainly. Fiction writers, at least in their bravest moments, do
desire the truth; to know it, speak it, serve it. But they go about it in a
particular and devious way, which consists in inventing persons, places
and events which never did and will never exist or occur and telling
about these fictions in detail […] and then when they are done writing
down this pack of lies, they say, There! That’s the truth! (“Introduction to
The Left Hand of Darkness” 156-157)

As Sophie Roux and others have noted, the term ‘thought experiment’ has
become vulgarized over the past fifty years. For Schrödinger and others, “a
thought experiment is a hypothetical scenario whose existence may or not be
achievable in reality and whose description aims to convince its audience of a
particular scientific principle” (Morton 3).
While Le Guin’s work does explore and even perform hypothetical
scenarios, it does not “aim to convince its audience of a particular scientific
principle”; and yet it would be a shame to disregard Le Guin’s comments about
using fiction to reveal and discover truth.
The type of experiment that Le Guin engages us in seems related to
something that both Foucault and Deleuze insisted on—the need to render
inconspicuous or seemingly normal concepts visible; the need to both suspend
and deconstruct their “necessary” and “evident” status (Foucault, Dits et écrits
23). Foucault in particular attempts to show that the origins of certain constructs
are both arbitrary and linked to cultural and political shifts, in short, to power
dynamics. Inspired by Nietzsche, he carried out this mission by using history to
unearth “evidences,” such as the prison system, and described the events and
discursive changes that are at the root of our notions of justice, incarceration and
subjectivity (24).
Unlike Foucault, Le Guin does not use historical narrative or
deconstruction, but rather playful, “fictional” storytelling to shake the very
ground of our thoughts and languages. Nor did she “analyze consciously” The
Tombs’ rich symbolism as she wrote (“Dreams” 11). She does not attempt to
extrapolate but to illuminate, render visible those very concepts that constitute
our mentalities and cultures but that remain somehow invisible in real-world
situations. She spoke time and again of the incapacity of realism to highlight our
cultural and linguistic underpinnings and was confident that magical realism,
science-fiction, fantasy and other “genre lit” would continue to more accurately
speak to our contemporary experiences, questions and worries (“Why Kids
Want Fantasy” 380). But how, precisely, do her characters, stories and worlds
shed light upon otherwise indiscernible building-blocks of our reality?
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When we read fiction and imagine its content, there is a constant back
and forth between the object a reader may be imagining and the subject the text
is describing, narrating, and contextualizing—there is a “making sense” of
things, to borrow a term from Deleuze (Lambert 38). In some ways, we might
think of reading (fiction in particular) as a game wherein the reader uses the
physical, material supports—scratches on paper, shapes on a screen, the sounds
of words—to call up images and ideas that roughly correspond to those put
forward by the text.
The images and ideas readers call up are not static entities, but serve as
figures, props in a game of make-believe. In his influential work, Mimesis as
Make-Believe, Kendall Walton demonstrates that the enjoyment of art, including
literary and other forms of fiction, is rooted in the human capacity to participate
in and play games of make-believe: “[T]o be fictional is, at bottom, to possess
the function of serving as a prop in games of make-believe” (102).
Readers of Le Guin’s work pretend that subjects such as Duny/Ged,
Tenar/Arha, and Earthsea itself are real each time they pick up the books or
think about the characters and events. In other words, they use these “image
subjects” (Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory 64), and their
names, as props in an on-going game of make-believe. Readers participate in the
game and attempt to fill in, color in, and flesh out the ideas and sense objects
they call to mind. This game is all the more enticing in that the images, sounds
and feelings elicited by the language are incomplete—they need to be filled in
and identified by the reader.
Furthermore, the fictional props readers play with are neither wholly
separate nor unrelated to our everyday thoughts and experiences. Le Guin in
particular very subtly plays with the reader’s real-world constructs by
introducing fictional ones; she leads the reader to construct images that diverge
from our dominate, everyday representations. In some cases, the reader is first
drawn into the story and must gradually rework his/her understanding of the
subject. For instance, by the time we learn that Duny/Ged has dark skin and that,
indeed, nearly all of the figures in A Wizard of Earthsea do, many readers may
have already begun imagining him as white. If so, they then had to rework
imaginings that were still only sketched in, that they had only begun to
construct. From the onset, then, these readers are drawn away from the white
or supposedly colorless center, and are then led to fill in, and quite literally, color
in a fictional subject. This experience, this shift in image consciousness from
initial imaginings and a default representation of the story’s who to a darkskinned center, is exactly the kind of thought provoking, performative, and
transformative experience that Le Guin’s work offers. Indeed, when we read Le
Guin’s work with both Walton and Foucault in mind, that is, as both engaging
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us in games of make-believe and provoking thought experiments, the power of
her work and worlds becomes all the more palpable.
The Tombs of Atuan engages us in a fantastical game of priestesses, GodKings, and dark forces; but within this whimsical framework, it sets puzzles for
readers concerning power, freedom, the oral versus the written tradition, the
relationship between names and their referents . . . . Again, these puzzles are not
wholly fictional in nature but involve real-world beliefs, concepts, and
institutions. One central prop readers of The Tombs use in their game-playing
experience is Tenar/Arha, whose exceptional political position and journey
present a puzzle regarding the limits and characteristics of subjectivity. This
riddle is formulated within a larger, metaphysical framework concerning
causes, language, and matter that must first be delineated if we are to
understand how The Tombs powerfully transforms readers’ understanding of
selfhood.
THE LAWS OF EARTHSEA
Magic courses through Earthsea. From a metaphysical perspective, it
seems to be an elemental property uniting, and yet lending specificity and
essence to, matter; it is at work within every single thing and is strongly
connected to language. This connection to language is of the utmost importance
for readers, as they themselves engage with the text, experience the power of its
names, and think about their own identity.
As Robert Galbreath points out, the magic of Earthsea is not Faustian,
striving to dominate nature, but part of a natural world that, in accordance with
Taoist philosophy, maintains a certain Equilibrium; it also seems to obey a sort
of principle of conservation of energy, to wit, the Taoist principle of inactivity
(262). The influence of the philosophy of Lao Tzu on the worlds of Le Guin is
fascinating, and well-documented, as are the significant Nordic and Celtic
components of her fantasy (Thompson). Yet the magical world-system of
Earthsea may evoke another philosophical school for some readers, as it is not
wholly dissimilar to the world-system early Stoic philosophers (such as
Chrysippus or Zeno) described, particularly concerning the relationship
between causes, matter, and the use of language. In the Stoic world-system, logos
and pneuma—that is, divine reason and the breath, along with fire and the other
elements to which it gives being—comprise the same immanent and pervasive
cause of both natural and human events. Speech is that which serves to express
thought (and potentially the divine reason which inspires it), but also denotes
the phenomena of our world-system and is itself materially and spiritually
constituted by the breath.
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Stoic metaphysics insists that sounds and words are material objects
(primarily, bits of air shaped by speakers; secondarily, their written
representations), whereas significations constitute one of four species of
incorporeal: lekta, literally ‘sayables’ [or pragmata, ‘things [done]’ […].
(Atherton and Blank 314)

The Stoic doctrine of bodies and incorporeals [σώματα and aσώματα]
is worth mentioning, not because this metaphysics is identical to the fantastical
world of Earthsea, but because of this essential link between language, matter,
and causal change. In Earthsea in effect, linguistic signs—names—appear to be
both corporeal and incorporeal—a physical sound and a signification—and, as
such, play a role in the causal relations binding all things.
This is a rock; tolk in the True Speech […]. A bit of the stone of which
Roke Isle is made, a little bit of the dry land on which men live. It is itself.
It is part of the world. […] To change this rock into a jewel, you must
change its true name. and to do that, my son, even to so small a scrap of
the world, is to change the world. (A Wizard of Earthsea 3.48)1

The Stoics did not believe in any kind of true lexicon, such as the lists
of true names in Earthsea imply. Nevertheless, the concept of a true lexicon that
identifies things at their essence and has causal influence on their movements
and actions is a compatible variation on the Stoic world-view. Indeed, the
concept of a “True Speech” composed of “true names” that are material parts of
the world only makes sense in a world-system where matter, divine reason, and
its linguistic expression are closely and intrinsically linked.2
In “The Rule of Names,” a school mistress, her charges, and the
bumbling Mr. Underhill introduce readers to a cultural practice/norm of
Earthsea and a corresponding core metaphysical principle: one must never
reveal one’s true name; and one must never ask the true name of another,
“Because the name is the thing […] and the truename is the true thing. To speak
the name is to control the thing” (937). Furthermore, the ontological
identification of name and true essence, i.e., “the truename is the true thing,”
does not stand alone but is accompanied by a principle of causality, one of the
natural laws that govern matter: “to speak the name is to control the thing.”
Because there are so many editions of the Earthsea books, citations are given in the format
chapter.page.
2 In their relevant article, “How They Do Things With Words,” Comoletti and Drout
highlight the parallels between a Judeo-Christian language of creation and medieval Latin
and Christian priests, on the one hand, and the Old Speech, wizards, and patterning in
Earthsea, on the other. However, they make no mention of the Stoic and Roman origins of
these Christian institutions (117).
1
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In A Wizard of Earthsea, the very first descriptions of this world’s magic
connect names, not only to people, animals, and other phenomena, but more
precisely to behaviors or actions and to their causes. Duny/Ged’s first teacher of
magic, his aunt, proposes to “teach him […] the word that makes a snail look out
of its shell, or the name that calls a falcon down from the sky” (1.15, italics added).
The next indication of the signification of names comes as young Duny faces the
Kargs and, feeling powerless, despairs that he might, “go into the dark land
without ever having known his own name, his true name as a man” (1.19).
These two instances make use of the two properties of names that we
have already identified. 1) A name is true; that is, an essential property of the
bearer, (e.g., “his true name as a man”). 2) Its essence is not separate from the
material world, but truly embedded in it, to such an extent that it constitutes a
cause or an impulse toward action (e.g., “makes a snail look out of its shell”).
These instances also make use of a third principle of names (and
efficient, magical causes) that we have not yet identified. This principle is
anthropological, and yet neither separate from nor inferior to, the metaphysical
or natural spheres. I am speaking of course of the “Passage” wherein children
“leave [their] childnames behind and keep only [their] truenames” (“Rule of
Names” 937). In A Wizard of Earthsea, the ceremony of Passage takes places on
the youth’s thirteenth birthday, whereupon “the witch took from the boy his
name Duny, the name his mother had given him as a baby. […] As he came to
the bank Ogion, waiting, reached out his hand and clasping the boy’s arm
whispered to him his true name: Ged” (1.24).
The naming ceremony, or passage, is no mere superfluous rite, but
produces a radical transformation, affecting the very essence of the bearer. For
readers playing the make-believe game and engaging with its enigmas, this
causal, transformative function appears highly relevant. Specifically, the sociocultural practice of naming and the corresponding change it effectuates in the
physical world inevitably raise the question of personhood—what some have
called, following Kant’s coinage—subjectivity. In contemporary philosophy, the
word is problematic at best—but in our context, in terms of the kinds of thoughts
and relations that Le Guin’s worlds provoke us into thinking about—we might
use it nevertheless, if only to refer to the fact of being a subject: an individual
and unified locus of thoughts, of feelings, and potentially of action.
In light of the characteristics of magic and names previously
indicated—names are essential parts of the physical world, they can be
imminent and efficient causes of behavior and action, and they can themselves
be transformed through magical rites and ritual—we might conclude that the
name is the subject. Indeed, the name appears to “get at” the very essence of the
thinking, feeling, acting individual. In this sense, there would seem to be a kind
of “‘mimological’ […] utopian construction of both sign and subject” (Robinson
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385); nevertheless, this utopian, mirror construction of sign and subject is at
odds with the fractured selves and the rent existences that give rise to the tales’
central conflicts and subsequent resolutions.
In the end, two competing forms of subjectivity appear to be at work
within this fictional world. The metaphysics of Earthsea are such that there
exists an ontological identification of sign with subject—in short, you are your
name; your name is you. At the same time, the relationship of name to named,
of sign to self, is also a dynamic, destructive, and active undertaking, an event
that takes place in the natural and social world. The apparent duality that
piqued our curiosity at the outset—that the butterfly is the caterpillar it once
was; yet the butterfly is a radically different and new being—also enthralls us in
Earthsea, as we contemplate names, the subjects to whom they refer, and the
profound changes they undergo.
We have seen how language, through its materiality, functions as an
efficient cause affecting, transforming the phenomena and events of Earthsea. It
is through knowledge of language that mages are able to exercise their power
within the natural-magical world-system. The role of the mage is, more
specifically, semantic and performative—for language here does not describe, it
does things, it enacts.
SUBJECTIVATION IN THE TOMBS OF ATUAN
This linguistic and cultural performativity may play a crucial role in
shifting readers’ understanding of subjectivity. In Earthsea, names—and not
propositions—and acts of speech—not descriptions—are surely the most
powerful constituents of language. But for Judith Butler and others, these claims
can also be made of our everyday cultures and settings (2). On an empirical level,
anthropologists such as Vom Bruck and Bodenhorn have probed into the power
of names, and namelessness, in a variety of cultures. We might conclude that
names and speech acts bridge the gap between signifier and signified in
Earthsea and, at least to some extent, in our own world.
For readers entertaining both fictional beliefs about Earthsea and
nonfictional beliefs about selfhood, this apparent conflation is consequential:
my name is not (merely) the linguistic marker that refers to me, it is me, who I
am. And yet, though ‘Meghann’ and my ‘self’ are mirror-images, this identity is
not given a priori; or rather, that which is given, in an infant or young child for
example, is at first ostensible, a surface-level tautology devoid of significant
content. A truly meaningful identity between name and self is instead enacted;
subjectivity is performed through speech and undergone in experience.
Borrowing loosely from Foucault’s lexicon, we might call this process
“subjectivation” (L’Histoire de la Sexualité II 18).
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If The Tombs of Atuan is indeed a Bildungsroman, it also relates a
particular instance of subjectivation. Indeed, Tenar’s tale is not Ged’s “young
man’s story” (Rawls 130). That “hero spends as little time as possible
underground; he longs for the journey upward to the light” (Sobat 25). Tenar,
the heroine, on the other hand, not only dwells underground; she revels in the
darkness, exploring, seeking, and finding power there. Tenar does embark upon
a “child’s journey” and ultimately emerges with a new sense of self, but the time
spent in the dark is a crucial component of her subjectivation. The darkness also
tantalizes readers, has them reveling in the mysteries of what Arha might do,
and who she might actually be. The reader is thus drawn into a moral and
philosophical query; though we may strive to imitate the heroine or identify
structural, universal elements of her journey, we are also wonderstruck
(thaumazein) by them, drawn into contemplating the landscape of power,
identity, and friendship that she navigates.
Tenar/Arha is at the center of at least two kinds of imaginings readers
engage in whilst enjoying The Tombs of Atuan. She is a prop in a make-believe
game of underground mazes, magical objects, god-kings, and priestesses; and
she also presents a wonderful puzzle about what makes us who we are in the
real-world realm of signs, concepts and culture. What happens when selfknowledge, personal memory, and even the use of the first person—the
grammatical subject ‘I’—are potentially excluded from one’s thoughts about
oneself? Who are we and who can we be when all of this is stripped away?
The Tombs tells a dramatic and violent tale of subjectivation, and in so
doing, challenges readers in their very understanding of subjectivity.
Specifically, the narrative leads the reader through three stages of identification
of name to subject. These three stages, moments of naming as it were, reflect the
active, violent, and unstable process of subjectivation mentioned above.
First, the initial interpellation of Tenar and her partial, indistinct
identification. Tenar is five years old.
Second, the passage to namelessness, the reader’s identification of
Arha. This moment is in fact a non-identification, an undoing and stripping
down of identity that moves us ever closer to the limits of subjectivity. Arha is
roughly speaking between six and twelve years of age.
And third, the retrieval of the name, the mirror-image identification of
Tenar. An identity is struck between name and subject, but also between the
sign ‘Tenar’ and its meaning “light in a dark place.” The naming process now
complete, Tenar can now be fully called out; there is a retrieval of selfhood in
the ethical sphere and a sense of coming home. Tenar is twelve to fifteen years
old.
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TENAR, YOUNG CHILD: AN INDISTINCT SUBJECT
The incipit of The Tombs of Atuan introduces us to the tale’s central
figure. We begin, “Come home, Tenar! Come home!” (Prologue.175).
From a linguistic standpoint, these opening lines make use of a
vocative and constitute a call or address. Specifically, the vocative ‘Tenar!’
appears to serve two functions here: within the story, the speaker (the mother),
employs it in an effort to activate the addressee, that is to somehow manage the
addressee’s behavior (Schaden). But externally, from the reader’s perspective,
(and perhaps also the mother’s), the vocative here also has an identifying
function, that is, it identifies a unique and physically discernible addressee from
a plurality of objects of consciousness.
What kind of referent is being called and sought out by the identifying
function? Not an unmoving, inanimate thing but a someone, an actionable
who—in other words, the referent is a subject insofar as it can potentially
respond to the call. In this sense, the call might also be thought of as an
interpellation—that is, the incipit articulates a name and identifies, or even
constitutes, a subject (Althusser 86).
Nevertheless, although the sign ‘Tenar’ under which we are to place
this someone is articulated from the onset, the subject to whom this sign
corresponds remains vague, abstract, incomplete—the identifying function of
the vocative falls short, leaves something to be desired.
In fact, the incipit’s introduction is indirect; “Come home, Tenar! Come
home!” does not actually present someone to the reader. What it does present is
a name, a sign to which a referent and a sense need to be assigned and filled in.
As we read on, the sketch of the referent is so sparsely drawn that no
complete image is brought to consciousness, and only an impartial identification
takes place between the Tenar that is called for and a fictional image-subject. We
read:
Down the orchard aisles, in the thick, new, wet grass, the little girl ran for
the joy of running; hearing the call she did not come at once, but made a
long circle before she turned her face towards home. The mother waiting
in the doorway of the hut, with the firelight behind her, watched the tiny
figure running and bobbing like a bit of thistle-down blown over the
darkening grass beneath the trees. (Prologue.175)

The subject being called for is plainly out of our grasp: back turned, in
movement, obscured by the interplay of shadow and light, we do not see Tenar
so much as seek her, glimpsing snippets of hair and movement through her
mother’s eyes.
Significantly, the subject Tenar is not simply being called out, but
activated, beckoned home by a parent. And yet the mother’s speech act, just like
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the thought act or “intentive mental process” wherein the reader seeks a referent
for the name ‘Tenar’, is not immediately satisfied—Tenar runs a long circle
before turning towards home (Husserl, Ideas “119,” 233).
Of course, this long circle, the delayed activation of the addressee,
prefigures the imminent uprooting and de-activation of the subject; for
ultimately, Tenar will not be “coming home” to her mother. And yet this
moment of identifying and activating—of seeking and beckoning the subject—
is all the more noteworthy that it elicits the reader’s participation. The call to
come home is effectively transferred to the reader, who begins The Tombs of
Atuan by calling and seeking an elusive, unfixed subject. Playing the mimetic
game of make-believe, we adopt the mother’s voice and follow her gaze, seeking
to behold Tenar as a parent seeks to hold and behold her own child. Thrown
into an intimate, familial, and blurred apprehension of the subject, the reader is
enjoined to identify and activate the heroine, not only through the use of
vocative-imperative in the initial beckoning, not only through the impartial
sketch of the child, but also through a preliminary and concise exposition of the
young child’s fate, from both the mother’s and the father’s point of view.
“Why do you let your heart hang on the child?” says father to mother—
and we learn that the mother’s calling out is vain, that Tenar will not in fact
come home but be taken away to become “The Priestess at the Tombs”
(Prologue.175). As the door closes on hearth and home, the care of the child—
the hanging heart as it were—is thus transferred over to the reader who takes
up the call, seeking the identification and activation of its addressee in the soonto-be absent mother’s stead: “‘When the time comes,’ the woman said, ‘I will let
her go.’” And the father’s “face in the dusk was full of grief, a dull, heavy, angry
grief that he would never find the words to say” (Prologue.176).
With the father’s final shrug, the reader takes up, and in her own game
of make-believe may mime, this distance, this separation of mother and child.
And yet, though the distance is sustained, the reader can do what the parents
cannot. Henceforth, we accompany this child/individual from afar, impotently
observing the destruction of self on the journey toward liberation and selfhood.
ARHA CHILD: FROM INDISTINCT SUBJECT TO THE LIMITS OF SELFHOOD
At age six, the young girl readers whom had thus far referred to as
‘Tenar’ passes from the airy, sunlit outdoors to darker, more somber spaces,
enclosed by walls and stone. She kneels before a throne that is filled with
emptiness and shadows, where light/white figures collide with dark/black ones;
her name, and her being are thus “given over” to the shadows, the Nameless
Ones (6.266). This passage to darkness is in many ways symbolic; that is, the
sacrifice does not extend to a physical death. And yet, the rite sacrifices more
than mere surface-level phenomena.
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In discussing the metaphysics of Earthsea, we briefly enumerated three
characteristics of names: they are incorporeal, that is, they signify or represent;
but they are also bodies, corporeal entities which can undergo change, through
cultural practices, magical speech acts, specifically. When Tenar’s name is taken
away, when she is “eaten” and given over to her “Masters,” something also
happens to her very substance, to the essential and defining spark that, in the
history of Western thought, once characterized a “single individual of a single
type” (Dennet 270), but what?
The “passage to darkness,” and Arha’s subsequent lifestyle and
experience, compromise at least three qualities that readers steeped in
Occidental culture and languages tend to predicate of a subject. Specifically, the
capacity to self-refer, to gain self-knowledge and to be a singular and unified
subject of memory and future actions (and intentions) are seriously limited in a
number of ways. The limitations of subjectivity brought about by the passage
might be explored under the simpler subheadings: name/pronouns; memory;
will.
NAME/PRONOUNS
The stripping away of the name, firstly, is not merely ceremonial, but
has effective and durable effects on the subject and her capacity to self-refer. The
very evening of her passage to namelessness Arha states, “I am not Tenar
anymore” (1.180). As alluded to above, Strawson famously identifies
personhood as “the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing
states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are
applicable [to a single individual of that single type]’” (qtd. in Dennett 290).
Furthermore, this single individual of that single type is generally referred to
through the use of a proper name—the understanding of which may “[consist]
in knowing a descriptive condition […] which something [the individual] must
satisfy to be the bearer of the name” (Textor 105). Yet in Arha, the relation to self
and to name that develops throughout early childhood is ruptured, abrogated
through the rites and power dynamics of the Tombs. She quite literally is no
longer Tenar, for she no longer bears the name; she is only Arha.
And yet the negation of the name ‘Tenar’ is only part of the story; for
though ‘Arha’ appears to be an empty referent—meaning merely “that which
has been eaten”—it nevertheless functions as a name, albeit under special,
exceptional conditions. Specifically, the bearer is no longer one unique,
corporally, and spiritually present, person but a complex singular collective, a
historical subject—the one and same Priestess born and reborn over the
centuries. As such, it is not merely the name ‘Tenar’ that is eaten but she, the selfreferring ‘I’ that had been present and that is now being replaced by an other ‘I’,
called Arha or the One Priestess. These new names indicate a form of
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subjectivity that exceeds the body and temporality of the little girl of age six.
This form of subjectivity would appear not to meet certain conditions of
personhood that were indicated above; namely, a “single individual of a single
type” to whom we ascribe states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics,
a knowable, describable or identifiable “bearer” of the name. In the passage to
namelessness and the assimilation of the One Priestess’ identity, we are, if not
outside subjectivity and personhood, at the very limit of the concepts.
As such, these challenges to the individual ‘I’ and to the ‘self’ in selfconsciousness play out in the linguistic obstacles Arha and others must
navigate. Speakers (and therefore, readers) are effectively constrained by
English grammar when referring to past princesses (the Arhas-that-were) who
are temporally and corporally distinct from an individual lifetime and body (the
Arha-that-is) and yet constitute one and the same subject (the One Priestess).
Repeatedly, the narrator, Manan, Kossil, Thar, and Arha herself
employ the pronouns ‘she,’ ‘you,’ ‘I,’ or ‘me,’ not to refer to the individual
person, but to this historical, transcendent subject—Arha’s self as something
that exists outside a present body and time. Thar explains to Arha: “I know
where the Great Treasure is. You told me the way, fifteen years ago, before you
died, so that I would remember and tell you when you returned” (4.214).
Conversely, Arha and others avoid personal pronouns when they refer
to Tenar’s experience and existence. “The child,” “it,” “the mother,” are not part
of Arha’s personal story and experience—though the girl craves knowledge of
them: “Tell me how I was chosen!” she demand, not once but twice (2.182-3).
And Manan encourages it:
“They brought the child back here, for it was indeed the Priestess
of the Tombs reborn, and here it belonged. And who was the child, eh,
little one?”
“Me,” said Arha, looking off into the distance as if to see something
she could not see, something gone out of sight. (2.184)

What is this something “gone of sight”? What is Arha-that-is looking
for? One might argue that she is seeking her self—the ‘me’ so long ago devoured.
During this exchange, she is probing memory, her own and Manan’s, for her
particular appearance in the story, for any content relating exclusively to her
individual existence:
Once she asked, “What did the . . . the mother do, when they came
to take the child away?”
But Manan didn’t know […]. And she could not remember. (2.185)
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MEMORY
Along with the suppression of name and the modification of linguistic
self-referencing, the passage paves the way for an equally pervasive and
repeated erasure of memory which is repeatedly enacted and performed
throughout the child’s six years at the Tombs. The near-total elimination of
memory is extensive, finally encroaching on Arha’s self-awareness and selfknowledge. For “As she grew older, she lost all remembrance of her mother
without knowing that she lost it” (2.182).
At twelve years of age our protagonist is not only unable to reconstitute
her personal story, but having been “given over” at so young an age has little
awareness of the extreme difference of her existence, even when compared to the
other girls and women of the Place. Arha’s questionings towards self-awareness
and self-knowledge constantly come up against this collective identity—things
she “has done” or “seen” before this life.
Nearly all memory of hearth and home, of mother and name is eroded
over time, and the subject is not even aware of the erosion: who she is, and who
she “always has been,” Arha, the eaten one, would seem to be all she knows, all
she has of self-knowledge.
And just like the name is not only taken away, but replaced by an
inadequate substitute, the loss of personal memory and self-knowledge is
compensated for by historical and cultural memories and knowledge: the
repetition of stories, rites, and dances, a deeply entrenched oral tradition
through which knowledge is transmitted.
‘Self-knowledge’ is not in this case knowledge about individual
desires, needs, and moral judgments, nor is it tied up in a personal story; Arha
knows who she is insofar as she knows the rites, rituals, tasks of the Tombs. And
her quest to more fully know this form of self has her assimilating the turnings
and layout of the Undertomb and Labyrinth themselves, and appropriating the
physical space as hers.
THE WILL TO POWER
This notion of appropriation brings us to a final characteristic of
subjectivity that is challenged during the time of namelessness, and yet is
perhaps not as radically altered as personal memory and self-knowledge are. A
subject, or person, is not merely a “type of entity such that both predicates
ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal
characteristics are applicable,” but is often deemed capable of action within the
sphere of human relations, activity and institutions. In the history of philosophy,
this facet of human existence, this capacity to do or to act has, in the subject, been
invariably correlated to a faculty of will, of decision-making or of spontaneity
that Strawson’s general definition seems to elide.
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At twelve years of age, the protagonist has little in the way of a name,
personal memory, and self-knowledge—for these “characteristics” of modern
subjectivity are, in Arha, greatly absorbed by historical memory, cultural
practices, and even geographical knowledge. This is certainly true for any
ethical judgments that the young Arha has to make; the knowledge upon which
she seems to draw in ethical matters is largely informed by the “sterile,”
“hollow,” and “lonely” cultural knowledge she has accumulated as Arha (Sobat
26). Yet it is precisely within this ethical sphere, that is, through her interactions
with others, that an individual will, power, and difference begin to break
through.
Attempts to thwart or subjugate the individual will by those in power
(and the structures they represent) are patent as this moment of namelessness
draws to a close. The most obvious example is when a twelve-year-old Arha
experiments with the power and authority of her identity as Priestess—at the
expense of her friend Penthe—and gets caught in the act.3 Thar states:
“It is better that you do only what is needful for you to do. You are
Arha.”
For a moment the girl raised her eyes to Thar’s face, then to Kossil’s,
and there was a depth of hate or rage in her look that was terrible to see.
But the thin priestess showed no concern; rather she confirmed, leaning
forward a little, almost whispering, “You are Arha. There is nothing left.
It was all eaten.”
“It was all eaten,” the girl repeated, as she had repeated daily, all
the days of her life since she was six. (2.192)

Significantly, the consequences of Arha’s act and use of the will—
Penthe’s punishment and the repeated subjugation of any individual will to
Arha—are lived out in the ethical sphere. Anger, guilt, and confusion are not
devoured but experienced, making a lasting impression on the young
adolescent, a point we shall return to presently.
At fifteen, at the “height of her powers,” the protagonist attempts
another utilization of Arha’s power when she is finally taken to the place
beneath the Stones. On the way, she exults in the discovery of her “domain,” her
“place” (3.200); she exults in her power and even gives Kossil the Priestess a
direct order. But when she crosses the Undertomb—the very place of death—
and must dole out a cruel death to three unknown, mute prisoners, the use of

Arha obliges Penthe to stay and cause mischief with her, asserting that Arha cannot be
punished and thus expecting no consequence to her acts. Arha is not whipped, but must
stay and silently watch Penthe being whipped for what Arha forced her to do.
3
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the young woman’s will in the ethical sphere is yet again subjugated to power
relations of which she is not even fully aware. Here again, however, the
emotional consequences of Arha’s ethical judgments—the prisoners’ murder
and her own entrapment—are deeply felt by the young woman, are not “eaten”
but provoke intense distress, thus fomenting a stronger “will to power” on her
part.
Interestingly, this moment concludes with another use of the
vocative—another identification in the dark and an effort to activate an
addressee. Even though she is the One Priestess reborn, in the place where only
she can go, Arha is trapped and cannot find the way out on her own:
“Mistress, the door will not open from inside. There is no way
out. There is no return.”
Arha crouched against the rock. She said nothing.
“Arha!”
“I am here!”
“Come!”
She came, crawling on hands and knees along the passage, like
a dog, to Kossil’s skirts. (3.204)
This use of the vocative is again an interpellation—one might even
understand ‘interpellation’ in the strict ideological sense that Althusser
describes. Doubly subjugated, both to Kossil’s perverse pleasure and to the
place of death, that is, to the ideologies of the God-King and the Nameless ones,
the young woman is again constituted as “eaten one,” her knowledge, discourse
and decision-making fully informed by these ideological spheres. Nevertheless,
despite this and other repeated instances of somatic and linguistic subjugation,
neither the assimilation of the young priestess’s identity, nor the suppression of
personal history, is absolute. In Arha, the eaten one, a lingering modicum of
memory and individuality seems to survive the period of namelessness and to
await activation—perhaps not unlike the sparse cellular memories retained
during some Lepidoptera species’ metamorphosis (Blackiston, Casey and
Weiss).
TENAR, YOUNG ADULT: COMING HOME AND ANSWERING THE CALL
During the time of darkness and namelessness, repeated linguistic and
cultural practices are aimed at suppressing the name, personal memory, and
knowledge. These reiterated instances bring about a negation of individual
identity, replacing the idea of self that was sketchily formed in young childhood
with the collective, yet empty and subjugated, idea of ‘Arha.’
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Whilst the narrative whittles name, personal memory, and selfknowledge down to a bare minimum, it simultaneously brings other aspects
associated with personhood into play. These aspects do not lie dormant in Arha,
but, between twelve and fifteen years of age in particular, are active contributors
to the formation of a new identity and the retrieval of a sense of self. Namely,
the defiant will, a desire for friendship and recognition, and a certain type of
self-awareness all resist the stripping away of name and self in Arha (perhaps
because they do not originate in Arha), and enable a performative retrieval of
self, a transformation.
THE WILL FOR SELF
As we have seen, attempts to subjugate the individual will in Arha
were generally successful in the short term. Arha does the bidding of the GodKing, in disposing of his prisoners, just as she is subject to the norms of the Place,
when she must watch Penthe being punished. In these respects, Arha is
“ideologically” constituted. At the same time, however, an individual will to
power, a personal desire to appropriate power for her own self, defies these
attempts at subjugation. As previously mentioned, she begins to exult in her
“domain” and the power of her position, attempting to find a place and identity
within the Nameless Ones’ framework, as the One Priestess. Here, first-person
pronouns surge: “my place” (3.200), “my domain” (3.194, 197), “I am the
Priestess” “I am Arha.” Ultimately, her attempts to achieve full power as the
One Priestess are countered by the overriding power structures and conflicts at
the Tombs—between the masculine power of a Godking and the feminine,
destructive, Nameless Ones for example (Littlefield 248; Barrow and Barrow 34).
And yet readers might see the desire to fully be the One Priestess as part of a
deeper determination that is not effectively quashed. The restive, defiant will of
the young woman is not only not snuffed out by the power structures of the
Tombs, it may even be fueled by the attempts to quell rebellious action. Readers
might recognize the everyday trope of teenage rebellion as Arha asserts herself
and sneaks around the Tombs. Additionally, the negative emotional
consequences—guilt, loneliness—of these instances of punishment and
subjugation seem to propel the Arha-that-is into adopting a form of action that
controverts the power structures from which the punishment emanates.
It is within this context that Arha undertakes a series of risky decisions
and life-threatening acts that ultimately “save” the young mage who wanders
into “her” domain (Littlefield 248). Indeed, the actions our heroine takes to
extricate Ged from the labyrinthine trap should, at least partially, be seen, not
as the result of some moral compunction that has somehow survived the violent
negation of self, but rather as an exercise of her own will to power, a step toward
reclamation and reformation of self. In effect, this series of life-threatening
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choices—leading Ged to the labyrinth, giving him water, satisfying her curiosity
about him, and finally not killing him—culminates in a clear, distinct choice
regarding her own subjectivity—a choice that is actually given in speech and
subsequently performed: “You must be Arha, or you must be Tenar. You cannot
be both” (Tombs 9.272).
FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION
A second, related element concerns the individual’s lived experiences,
specifically her relations to others in the form of friendship. Despite the power
relations that seek to isolate Arha, others do enter into her experience and act as
friends. Manan in particular encourages her relationship to self, providing
elements of her own personal story, comforting her as she grieves her loss of
name, memory and freedom. He rarely calls her Arha. Instead, she is “little one”
and “honey comb”—the sense of this latter sobriquet is evidently suggestive of
the meaning of ‘Tenar’ that is finally disclosed by Ged. Even though Manan
cannot “fill the gap[s]” in the young woman’s personal story and identity, his
“petnames,” fidelity, and stories do introduce other possibilities of selfhood to
Arha (Sobat 29). He also provides an essential other perspective on their world.
“Again Manan had showed her a new way of seeing things” (Tombs 3.197).
Penthe’s friendship is equally significant as it provides a conduit for Arha to
experience the ethical sphere—not just in the consequences engendered by
Arha’s attempt to dominate her, but in her radical otherness. Penthe’s blatant
faithlessness and Epicureanism provide a striking contrast to Arha’s ascetic
rigor and show her an other, albeit limited and dominated, form of life.
The friendship of both Penthe and Manan is thus instrumental in
showing other possibilities of selfhood to Arha; but ultimately these
relationships remain governed by the power relations and norms of the Tombs.
Manan, for instance, is incapable of comprehending Arha’s movements toward
self at the story’s close, and endangers her life as a result. Similarly, Penthe is
immediately struck down when she naively sees Arha as an equal, as a freethinking yet subjugated being like herself (Tombs 4.209). As such, Ged’s arrival
and the trust that builds between the two is the single most influential encounter
with Other of the young woman’s life. Ged’s radical otherness—he is a
“stranger” (5.225)—leads nevertheless to a liberating experience of mutual
recognition, to borrow an oft-borrowed concept from Hegel’s discussion “On
Lordship and Bondage” i.e., the Master/Slave dialectic (104-119). Yet it makes
sense to apply the concept of mutual recognition to The Tombs’ puzzle about
subjectivity: for Arha ends up seeing the intruder, not as he would be construed
by the Tombs’ discourse and ideology, but as a full, free person; conversely, Ged
sees Arha as a person in her own right; he does not relegate “who” she is to her
political function, religious name, or dark, morally ambiguous, past.
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Ged sees our protagonist’s true self and knows her truename, perhaps
not simply because he has a gift for names, but because he is neither slave nor
master in this domain. He apprehends Tenar/Arha from outside of the linguistic,
cultural, and ideological groundwork of the Kargad lands. Free from that
particular discourse, he is the only character capable of apprehending her as
another free self-consciousness. This outside perspective seems key to
understanding how, precisely, “Ged serves as a catalyst for Tenar’s escape”
(Littlefield 248). Indeed, although Manan has an inkling of the meaning of
‘Tenar,’ the power dynamics and discursive structures of the Tombs make true,
mutual recognition impossible. Here again, the mutual recognition that
conditions subjectivity is performed or actualized in speech (when Ged reveals
his truename in a spirit of reciprocity); and it is enacted through the joining of
the two halves of the ring of Erreth-Akbe, one half of which was in Ged’s
possession and the other in the treasury of the Tombs.
Mutual recognition, or friendship, along with a defiant will, plays a
fundamental role in The Tombs’ plot, contributing to Arha’s escape and the
beginning of a new journey. Within the puzzle Le Guin sets readers concerning
subjectivity, these two factors are noteworthy in that they catalyze the
individual’s retrieval of selfhood and her transformation. The fact that these
conditions for subjectivity are not “intrinsic” but develop within the ethical and
political sphere—in human relations and plurality—is highly relevant.
SELF-AWARENESS
A third condition, or quality, of subjectivity has not yet been fully
examined, and yet, in a sense we have been discussing it all along. That is, isn’t
subjectivity first and foremost a kind of feeling or awareness of one’s self as a
unique and irreducible entity—a ‘me’ who experiences the world both passively
and actively? At the core of a given subject, shouldn’t we find the inimitable who
of the story, and with it, a property, quality, or feeling that excludes all other
phenomena? Surely, Tenar/Arha, just like the rest of us, has a basic sense of who
she is . . . .
At first glance, this third notion of a unique property at the core of the
subject appears to hold great weight in the narrative, for the name ‘Tenar’ and
its corresponding meaning “a light in a dark place,” are a central theme. And
yet, as we mentioned at the outset, the meaning of the name encompasses a
paradox that lies at the very heart of The Tombs’ puzzle about subjectivity. On
the one hand, when we consider that Tenar’s name precedes her experience as
Arha, that the meaning of the name in fact foreshadows the events that play out
in the years to come, the narrative appears to portray subjectivity as an inherent,
unique, and foundational phenomenon, existing independently of events,
power structures, and the ethical realm. On the other hand, the very fact that the
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name ‘Tenar’ and its meaning can be so drastically stripped away—the fact that,
had one choice or happening gone differently, this unique meaning would never
be disclosed—points to the illusory nature of any such unique, describable
property. The fact that Arha searches blindly for selfhood, and embarks upon a
dangerous quest to find it, demonstrates just how contingent and uncertain is
the idea of self that is given in early childhood. In a word, a name is “empty”
until events, choices, and others come together and fill it in.
This paradox is evident in two conflicting interpretations of how the
signifier ‘Tenar’ operates during the time of namelessness, that is, during her
time as Arha: either it is insignificant (Barrow and Barrow 34) or “true” and
present, but “cannot be named […] or receive the social speech acts of others”
(Comoletti and Drout 123). These conflicting interpretations are both right, and
yet both fall short. For the narrative itself tends to show that ‘Arha’ is a signifier
in its own right, and as such receives many social speech acts—a ritualized
passage into a collective subjectivity, acts of subjugation and dominance by
Kossil for instance. Though ‘Tenar’ and its meaning are “true” in Arha-that-is,
the name does not meaningfully and continuously refer to the individual, nor
describe who the subject is. Despite Le Guin’s carefully placed hints at the very
beginning of the novel, neither the reader nor the protagonist knows ‘Tenar’’s
signification until the quest for self is well under way; its true meaning cannot
be accessed until the story’s close. In fact, the revelation of the name actually
does something in the story: it opens up previously closed-off possibilities of
action and selfhood for Arha/Tenar. As a result, this revelation, and the
reciprocal revelation of Ged’s name, are speech acts that call out and constitute
the subject. In other words, these acts transform the “eaten one” into “a light in
a dark place.”
Insofar as the revelation of the name and its corresponding meaning
occur in speech, insofar as this meaning is actually enacted in the series of events
that constitute the story, the essence of the subject—its ‘who’—though univocal,
is not given a priori, nor is it intrinsic to the subject. Rather, the self’s essence is
intrinsic to the story. Indeed, the retrieval of meaning is not located within the
subject; it is revealed in relationships, forged in events, and performed in speech.
It is the result of an individual will, mutual recognition, and the series of events;
but it is not their condition.
As the tale comes to a close, the action-packed sequence of events leads
to a dynamic and active retrieval of selfhood: a re-identification of the young
woman Arha/Tenar—the meaning of Tenar now unearthed as it were, through
her actions and choices. The reader can finally “see” her clearly, is able to grasp
the thought of her and fix this thought in her mind. In effect, the story ends with
a third instance of hailing, that yet again attempts to activate the addressee with
the imperative “Come!”
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He leapt up onto the pier, holding his hand out to her. “Come!” he said
smiling, and she rose, and came. Gravely she walked beside him up the
white streets of Havnor, holding his hand, like a child coming home.
(12.300)

Unlike the incipit’s “Come home,” the attempt to activate and identify
the addressee is fully successful here. Interestingly, no vocative, no proper name
is invoked this time—the gesture of holding a hand out and smiling at the
individual replaces the vocative in this final moment of naming and calling. But
the absence of name seems significant. The retrieval of selfhood, the
transformation, is complete, and the identification of name to subject so clear
and evident that it suffices. Tenar knows who she is; and we as readers have
finally satisfied the initial call for the subject, as well as the desire, transferred at
the story’s start, to bring her home.
CONCLUSION

Who is Tenar/Arha? She is a fictional subject, a prop in a game of makebelieve, but she is also the central constituent of a thought experiment.
Subjectivity is seriously challenged in Arha, where “subject” refers to a
nameable nexus of memory, knowledge, and intention residing in a unique and
unified body. Nevertheless, Arha/Tenar retrieves her selfhood at the story’s
close. Consequently, if The Tombs of Atuan is to yield any notion of a subject, no
set of universally true and immutable conditions can be delineated. Rather,
subjectivity is constituted and performed in experience, in what we have called
the ethical sphere. What, then, should we conclude concerning the time not being
Tenar? Is it nothing more than a variable in a thought experiment, or, in Tenar’s
own words, simply a “waste” (Tombs 12.298)?
At the outset, we noted that language in Earthsea should not primarily
be seen as descriptive. This metaphysics is key to understanding how the time
as Arha violently excludes elements of subjectivity, but is not a “waste.”
Retaining the third, anthropological principle of names and causes, one might
suggest that Tenar/Arha in fact experiences two passages in which the
respective suppression and revelation of the name effectively cause change and
transformation. The social or “ethical” self that is constituted at the story’s end
is the result of a second passage—the revelation of Tenar and Ged’s names, the
joining of the ring halves, and the tremendous ascent from out of the earth and
the shadows. For Le Guin, these moments or “passages” are, symbolically,
“sex,” that is, “[b]irth, rebirth, destruction, freedom” (“Dreams” 11). In this
respect, Tenar/Arha is thus a girl turning into a woman, a child turning into an
adult, initiated, as it were, through sex.
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Anthropologically speaking, women’s initiation rites often center on
sexual maturity: in some cultures underscoring the “destruction” with bodily
mutilation, in others focusing on a young woman’s fulfilment in her new
creative capacity, that is, “freedom” (Lincoln 97). In addition, these initiation
rites often involve three stages, or passages, from one state of being to another.
The community as a whole participates in the “enclosure, metamorphosis […]
and emergence” (101) of the initiand, not to change her status in the social
hierarchy, but to transform her into something “more creative, more alive, more
ontologically real” (104).
This is of course highly suggestive of our analysis of the moments of
naming in The Tombs of Atuan. It revealed that an idea of self is present in the
young child, Tenar, though it is incomplete and dreamlike, given in immediacy,
but without definition. In Arha, this self is “destroyed,” or at least severely
limited and subjugated to the conflicting power relations and discourses of the
Tombs. But this very destruction also creates a space for Tenar, the young adult,
to become actualized. Indeed, it is only after the destruction of the child self that
a fully defined idea of self comes into being—it is born through interactions with
others, in speech and in shared action. Amidst the rubble of namelessness and
darkness, the ethical self triumphs. Tenar/Arha thus accomplishes this journey
from undefined selfhood, to destruction and, finally, to re-creation. She is the
triumphant transformation of self in the social sphere, an example of
subjectivation.
For young readers whose journey through childhood is incomplete,
and for parents or siblings observing the process, the radical, destructive loss of
the child self in adolescence is a source of anxiety. Could Tenar/Arha’s tale help
to assuage this anxiety by providing us with symbols for the physical and
ontological transformation that occurs in adolescence? If Tenar/Arha is an
initiand, and her story both an initiation rite and an instance of subjectivation,
can these fictional props help us through our own experiences of
transformation? In this final respect, Le Guin’s allegory may have real mythmaking potential. In a world where local rites, symbols, and meaning seem to
be slipping away, fantastical literature can communicate the social value and
purpose of the journey from a fledgling idea of self, to its destruction and its
rebirth in the social sphere.
The Tombs of Atuan seems to intimate that who a child is, is not
predetermined at the start; nor is it solely dependent on individual intentions,
choices and acts. Who we are is forged out of things we cannot control—culture
and power conflicts, the people who come into our lives—and our choices and
deeds. The adult we end up with at the end of adolescence is not the child that
once was, though some elements subsist transformation. Finally, destruction
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and loss of self are necessary moments on the path to becoming a full, active,
and creative self.
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